Seven days into the succession vacuum. The "by March 6" Polymarket market dropped 24 points overnight — from 65% to 41.5%. The burial lock is holding. There is still no Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic.
The conventional analysis of the interregnum focuses on what it enables: escalation continues on autopilot, the IRGC runs operations, the hot default produces drift toward the last active war posture. I wrote that argument in The Hot Default and The Founding Act.
What I have not named is the other side: what the interregnum prevents. Not metaphorically — structurally. There are five deals on the table right now. None of them can be signed. The structural reason is simple and it has nothing to do with politics.
Each of these represents a plausible off-ramp from the current situation. Each requires a constitutionally authorized Supreme Leader to commit Iran's side of the agreement. Each is frozen until one exists.
Why does each of these specifically require the Supreme Leader rather than the President, the Supreme National Security Council, or the IRGC command?
Iran's constitution concentrates final authority under the velayat-e faqih — the guardianship of the Islamic jurist. The Supreme Leader is not a figurehead. He is the constitutional principal whose religious authority validates every binding state action. The President administers policy within that framework. The SNSC coordinates security policy within that framework. The IRGC executes within that framework. None of them can step outside it without invalidating the legitimacy of the entire system.
A deal signed by Iranian President without Supreme Leader sanction is not binding under Iranian constitutional law. It can be reversed by the next Supreme Leader. It cannot be trusted by the counterparty as a durable commitment. This is not a technicality — it is the entire basis on which Iran's adversaries know what Iranian commitments mean.
Here is the structural problem that nobody has named publicly.
Trump's War Powers clock started February 28. Under the War Powers Resolution, Trump has 60 days before Congressional authorization becomes constitutionally required. April 29 is the hard deadline. Around Day 30–45 (late March to mid-April), Congressional authorization debate will begin consuming the political oxygen.
A negotiated US withdrawal — the best outcome for everyone — requires Iran to commit to post-withdrawal conditions. Iran cannot make that commitment without an authorized Supreme Leader. The interregnum currently has no known end date.
The race condition: If Mojtaba's installation is delayed beyond early April, the Congressional authorization debate may make the negotiated withdrawal structurally unavailable. Congress could force withdrawal under the War Powers Resolution without any deal. Iran gets the US out without conceding anything. Mojtaba gets no founding narrative. The US gets no post-withdrawal assurances. The best possible outcome disappears — not because of failure to negotiate, but because the interlocutor was absent while the window was open.
This is what I argued in Mojtaba's Clock: the War Powers deadline constrains Mojtaba more than it constrains Trump. But the deal-table analysis makes it sharper. The constraint is not just political. Every deal that could produce a dignified US exit and a legitimate Mojtaba installation requires the same thing: an authorized counterparty on Iran's side. The window for that counterparty to appear and negotiate is closing at one day per day.
The empirical record through Day 7 is not ambiguous.
On the escalation axis: Lebanon offensive active (100,000 reservists), Hormuz closed (Western insurance pulled March 5), Iranian missile salvos vs. US bases, Pakistan-Afghanistan border war ongoing. Everything that was running on autopilot is still running. Nothing on this axis has been interrupted.
On the deal axis: nothing. No ceasefire signal. No Hormuz reopening. No prisoner release. No nuclear track opened. No formal back-channel announcement. Zero movement.
The autopilot thesis is not a theory anymore. It is seven days of evidence. The IRGC can execute war plans without the Supreme Leader. It cannot sign a peace plan. The asymmetry is structural, and the interregnum is extending it.
The March 6 Polymarket market — which was at 65% yesterday — collapsing to 41.5% today is the market's recognition that the burial lock is stronger than expected. The locked loop is not breaking on schedule. Each day it holds, the deal window narrows further.
After Mojtaba installs, the time to the first signed deal will be the most informative single data point we will have about what happened during the interregnum.
Deal within 72 hours of installation: Back-channels were active during the vacuum. Deal space was fully mapped. Mojtaba was briefed and decided before announcing. The bundled announcement scenario reconstitutes (announcement + founding act simultaneously). Brent drops $6–10 in a single session.
Deal within 2 weeks of installation: Back-channels were active but incomplete. Mojtaba needed to see the mapped terrain before deciding. Normal post-installation diplomacy. Brent drops in stages as each deal element is announced.
No deal within 30 days of installation: Back-channels were not meaningfully active during the vacuum. The deal space was not mapped. Mojtaba inherits a war posture, not a peace framework, and must build the diplomatic track from scratch. Brent stays elevated. War Powers clock forces a Congressional resolution rather than a negotiated exit.
The interregnum's legacy will be legible in this single number: days between installation and first signed deal.